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Crafting a Standard: Environmental Crimes as
Crimes Against Humanity Under the International
Criminal Court
By Jessica Durney*
Abstract
This paper will craft a framework through which the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”) could begin prosecuting individuals for crimes against humanity
under the Rome Statute for their actions against the environment. Despite the lack
of environmental considerations in the prima facie language of the Rome Statute,
the definition of “crimes against humanity” can be used to prosecute individuals
who utilize environmental destruction to target specific groups. This, coupled with
the ICC’s recent stated shift in focus on prosecuting cases resulting in “the
destruction of the environment,” opens the door to a new era of environmental
justice in international criminal law. To craft a framework for prosecuting
environmental harms as crimes against humanity, this paper will analyze the
statutory allowance for environmental destruction in the Rome Statute, outline
other international tribunals to demonstrate how human rights have evolved to
incorporate environmental destruction, and utilize current examples of attacks on
the environment to harm targeted groups to demonstrate the admissibility of the
ICC’s jurisdiction. Ultimately, this framework can establish protections for the
environment through the ICC’s anthropocentric prosecutorial system and help set
precedence for environmental justice at the international level.

Introduction
On September 15, 2016, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) Prosecutor
Fatou Bensouda published a Policy Paper announcing a shift in focus toward
assessing crimes that result in “the destruction of the environment or of protected
objects.”1 The assessment of the impact of the alleged crime would consider the

* Jessica Durney is a J.D. candidate at the University of California, Hastings College
of the Law, class of 2018. She received her B.A. in political science from the University of
California, Irvine in 2014. She wishes to thank her professors David Takacs, Hadar Aviram,
and Naomi Roht-Arriaza for their guidance in developing this note, and her family for their
patience and support through this year.
1. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, POLICY PAPER ON CASE SELECTION AND
PRIORITISATION, para. 40, (hereinafter “2016 Policy Paper”) https://www.icc-cpi.int/items
Documents/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UY3NC62R].
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“environmental damage inflicted on the affected communities.”2 Within this
framework, the Prosecutor noted that the ICC would give “particular consideration
to prosecuting Rome Statute crimes that are committed by means of, or that result
in, inter alia, the destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural
resources or the illegal dispossession of land.”3 This Policy Paper, which will
“serve as a key guiding instrument for the Office of the Prosecutor in its selection
and prioritisation of cases for investigation and prosecution,”4 presents an
important and potentially seismic shift in the way the ICC and the global
community looks at environmental harm. An inclusion of environmental
degradation within evaluations of human rights violations “should send a warning
shot to company executives and investors that the environment is no longer their
playground,” argues Alice Harrison, an adviser at the international environmental
watchdog NGO, Global Witness.5
While it indeed poses an exciting opportunity to hold accountable the
previously untouchable, the vagueness of the Policy Paper and the novelty of the
notion means that the international community is left guessing exactly how
environmental harm will be considered in tandem with the ICC’s prosecution
framework under the Rome Statute. The Court has jurisdiction to prosecute
individuals for “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community
as a whole,” including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the
crime of aggression.6 These are not the typical areas of law through which
enterprising legal minds have attempted to penalize environmental harms.
This paper will craft a framework through which the ICC could begin
prosecuting individuals for crimes against humanity through their actions against
the environment. The Rome Statute operates under an inherently anthropocentric
view of “harm,” meaning that the remit extends only to actions negatively affecting
people, and that actions polluting or degrading the environment alone will not fit
the remit of the ICC. This is a frustrating limitation in the fight to protect the
environment. Despite this limitation, the broadening of the ICC’s remit to include
this language and the subsequent cases brought before the ICC could create a farreaching rippling effect. Many States follow the Rome Statute definitions to
implement international crimes into their own domestic legislation, so establishing
an interpretation allowing for prosecution of environmental destruction from the

2. Id. at para. 41.
3. Id.
4. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, PRESS RELEASE (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1238 [https://perma.cc/TA4P-QXVW].
5. John Vidal and Owen Bowcott, ICC widens remit to include environmental
destruction cases, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/global/
2016/sep/15/hague-court-widens-remit-to-include-environmental-destruction-cases
[https://perma.cc/WH9U-7YA4].
6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Part II, Art. 5(1), 17 July 1998,
(hereinafter “Rome Statute”).
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ICC could reach into domestic adjudication.7 Here is an opportunity to establish a
legal precedent that intentional harm to the environment which deprives people of
their life is a violation of human rights. Enterprising legal minds could utilize this
precedent to affect change at both the international and domestic levels. By
breaching conventional notions of international criminal law to include
environmental considerations, the ICC could pave a path for other courts—both
with international and domestic jurisdiction—and expand the frontier for
environmental justice.
Part I of this note will outline the traditional understanding of the ICC’s remit
and how it ultimately lacks the ability to prosecute purely environmental harms.
Part II will shift to demonstrate how environmental harms have gained
international attention, and have been the focus of other universal jurisdiction laws
to prosecute wrongdoers. Finally, Part III will combine the knowledge and
precedent from these cases with the ICC’s recent Policy Paper, and outline a
framework the Court can use under its new prioritization of harms against the
environment as a foundation for prosecution for crimes against humanity. Two
current examples demonstrate the potential application of this framework: the
Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, and issues of widespread land grabbing in Cambodia.
Ultimately, this framework will establish protections for the environment through
the ICC’s anthropocentric prosecutorial system, and ensure that those who harm
the environment are held accountable.

Part I: The Rome Statute: An Unconventional Route for Seeking
Environmental Redress
While there are institutional limitations to crafting a framework to protect
the environment under the ICC’s jurisdiction, the Rome Statute has room in its
interpretation to incorporate specific instances of environment harm as a “crime
against humanity.” Its two great limitations stem from two aspects inherent to the
statute. First, the ICC’s jurisdiction derives solely from the Rome Statute, which
makes extremely limited explicit mention of environmental crimes. Second, while
the recent 2016 Policy Paper expresses a shift in focus and concentration on
environmental destruction, the ICC is not expanding the number of core crimes it
will prosecute.8 Thus, any case brought before the ICC must still constitute a
violation of one of the four existing crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. The best
avenue of the four core crimes is Article 7, “crimes against humanity,” under which
the Prosecutor must prove the required actus reus and mens rea elements.9

7.

Evelyne Schmid, TAKING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
CRIMINAL LAW, Cambridge Univ. Press (2015), at 65, noting that “. . .
because of the complementarity mechanism of the ICC, many states follow the Rome Statute
definitions when they implement international crimes in domestic legislation. The Rome
Statue is thus a useful starting point to understand the elements of international crimes . . .”
8. 2016 Policy Paper, supra note 1, at 3, noting that “This is an internal document of
the Office and as such, it does not give rise to legal rights.”
9. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7 requires the actus reus of an “attack” and a mens
rea of “directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”

IN INTERNATIONAL
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A.

Inherent Statutory Limitations

The Court derives its jurisdiction from the Rome Statute, an international
treaty ratified in 2002 that established four internationally recognized crimes:
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.10
There are two limitations inherent from the outset. First, the prima facie language
of the Statute contains only one single mention of the word “environment,” and it
is contained in a provision that requires an incredibly specific set of circumstances.
Individuals may be prosecuted for violating “war crimes” for:
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.11
Such attack must also be “committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of
a large-scale commission” of such actions during wartime.12 This list of required
elements and a temporal limitation tied to times of war makes this an incredibly
narrow window of opportunity for prosecution. This is arguably the reason why
no case has ever been brought before the ICC relying on these claims, and only a
handful have been brought in any international criminal tribunal.13 Otherwise, the
Rome Statute does not mention environmental harm. Furthermore, the crux of
each of the established core crimes turns on the effects on humans, making the law
inherently anthropocentric. Broadly, this limitation represents the greatest obstacle
to prosecuting environmental crimes, but one that this note does not attempt to
solve. Instead, this paper argues that the Rome Statute can be interpreted to include
consideration of environmental harm used as a tool to violate human rights as a
crime against humanity.
B.

Opportunities for Broader Interpretation: Crimes Against
Humanity

The Rome Statute defines “crimes against humanity” as specific acts
“committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”14 The Statute further defines

10. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(1). The Rome Statute has left “crimes of
aggression” undefined, and it is beyond the scope of this article to consider potential
environmental crimes that could fit within a potential definition.
11. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
12. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
13. Ryan Gilman, Expanding Environmental Justice after War: The Need for
Universal Jurisdiction over Environmental War Crimes, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 447, 451–458.
14. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7(1).
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“widespread or systematic” and “attack directed against any civilian population”
as “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts . . . pursuant to
or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.”15 Of
the eleven defined acts constituting crimes against humanity, there are two that are
most relevant to the prosecution of environmental crimes: extermination and
deportation or forcible transfer of population. Upon first reading, there are several
limitations in using crimes against humanity to prosecute environmental harms.
The actus reus that constitutes the environmental harm must be “systematic” in that
it occurs more than once.16 The mens rea requires a level of intent in committing
the harm as part of a grander scheme against a specific group.17 This is particularly
troublesome, as many environmental harms (and indeed harms more generally)
happen as singular events and stem from economic motivations, such as attempting
to avoid regulations to maximize profits. Additionally, the mens rea required for
prosecution is intent with “knowledge,” though the Statute allows for awareness of
the consequences “in the ordinary course of events” to meet this threshold.18
Finally, the act must “shock the conscience of mankind,” a label generally reserved
for “actions whose results are grave to humankind and not the natural
environment.”19
There are two enumerated actions constituting crimes against humanity in
which environmental harms could fit: extermination and deportation or forcible
transfer of population. The Rome Statute defines extermination as “the intentional
infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and
medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population.”20
Perpetrators who destroy or interfere with the natural environment with the purpose
of destroying a particular group would fit under this category. An example, which
will be explored further in Part III, is the systematic burning of farmland, crops,
and villages of Rohingya Muslims to drive them out of the majority-Buddhist
Myanmar.21

15. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7(2)(a).
16. Matthew Lippman, International Law and Human Rights Edition: Crimes
Against Humanity, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 171, 263.
17. Id. at 262.
18. Mohammed Saif-Ailden Wattad, The Rome Statute & Captain Planet: What Lies
Between ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ and the ‘Natural Environment’? 19 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L. REV. 265, 277.
19. Payal Patel, Expanding Past Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and War
Crimes: Can an ICC Policy Paper Expand the Court’s Mandate to Prosecuting
Environmental Crimes?, 14 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 175, 192, citing Frederic Megret,
The Problem of an International Criminal Law of the Environment, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
195, 218 (2011).
20. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7(2)(b).
21. Sergio Peçanha and Jeremy White, Satellite Images Show More Than 200
Rohingya Villages Burned in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/interactive/2017/09/18/world/asia/rohingya-villages.html?_r=0 [http://perma.
cc/6F45-68YJ].
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Deportation or forcible transfer consists of “forced displacement of the
persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they
are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.”22 This
language was first proposed by a Special Rapporteur in the Draft Code of Offences
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, created in 1989.23 In the draft code,
the Special Rapporteur specifically adds to the previous analysis of deportation or
forcible transfer from the 1954 draft, incorporating “serious and intentional harm
to vital human assets, such as the human environment,” and “cultural property and
other vital human assets, such as the environment.”24 While this would seem to
allow more room within the traditional remit for environmental harm, the Special
Rapporteur then further elaborates that crimes against humanity are “distinguished
by motive,” in that they are prompted by “ideological, political, racial, religious or
cultural intolerance and strike at a person’s innermost being, i.e. his convictions,
beliefs or dignity.”25 Further, the “systematic” language limits the harms to those
that are “a recurrent practice or plan,” and inherently not “isolated acts . . . not
encompassed in the text.”26 Land-grabbing would best fit under this classification
of crimes against humanity, and indeed there has been some movement previously
to bring the Cambodian government to the ICC for systematically seizing
farmland, as will be discussed in Part III.27
Crimes against humanity present the broadest avenue for prosecuting
environmental harms. However, while there are ample opportunities to connect
actions against the natural environment with the subsequent negative effects on
humans, the statutory requirements of “systematic” actions with the specific intent
to “caus[e] great suffering” present institutional hurdles to many of the more
common environmental harms. Such limitations will limit the actors subject to
prosecution and exclude actions that are isolated.

Part II: A Shift in International Human Rights Tribunals Brings
Environmental Destruction into the Conversation
There are emerging trends in international courts that give rise to
opportunities to build on the traditional remit of the ICC to allow incorporation of
22. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7(2)(d).
23. Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Fourth
Report, Mr. Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398 (1986)
24. Matthew Lippman, International Law and Human Rights Edition: Crimes
Against Humanity, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 171, 262.
25. Id., citing Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
supra note 16 at 87.
26. Id. at 263, noting that “The systematic element requires a recurrent practice or
plan while the mass-scale component is directed at the number affected. Isolated acts—no
matter how atrocious—are not encompassed within the text.”
27. Chris Arsenault, Cambodian land grabs are ‘crime against humanity’, lawyers
tell ICC, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-foundation-cambodialandgrabs/cambodian-land-grabs-are-crime-against-humanity-lawyers-tell-icc-idUSKCN0
HW1R420141007 [https://perma.cc/Q3W8-NRMV].
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environmental harms. This note will focus on the three international human rights
tribunals—the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the European
Court on Human Rights, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights—
which have all started incorporating environmental damage into considerations of
human rights violations. The African Commission in particular has adopted
enumerated protections for the people regarding the environment. The European
Court and the Inter-American Commission have used similar human rights
protections to the Rome Statute and broadened their interpretation to incorporate
environmental harms into the analysis. Each of these tribunals offer lessons to the
ICC as it seeks to broaden its remit to consider the “environment damage inflicted
on the affected communities,”28 with “particular consideration to prosecuting
Rome Statute crimes that are committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia,
the destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or
the illegal dispossession of land.”29
A.

The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights

The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights provides a
framework of environmental destruction constituting human rights violation that
can guide the ICC’s analysis in similar cases. Article 24 of the African Charter of
Human and Peoples’ Rights states, “all peoples shall have the right to a general
satisfactory environment favorable to their development.”30 Though never more
fully defined in the Charter, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights first assessed this right nearly twenty years after the Charter was adopted in
The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and
Social Rights v. Nigeria.31 In this particularly ground-breaking case, the
Commission held that Nigeria had violated the Ogoni indigenous peoples’ human
rights through its actions both in failing to protect or prevent and by actively
attacking the Ogoni peoples’ environment.32 A Nigerian-owned oil company had
exploited Ogoni land for oil, contributed to air pollution, and disposed of toxic
waste into the land and water, all without the consent of the Ogoni peoples, and
without following the permitting process by the Nigerian government.33

28. 2016 Policy Paper, supra note 1, at para. 41.
29. Id.
30. African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Par. I, ch. 1, Article 24 (Oct. 21,
1986), available at http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ABJ4-X7SQ].
31. The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and
Social Rights v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No.
155/96 (2001) [hereinafter “the Ogoni case”] at para. 52, available at https://hrlibrary.un
medu/africa/comcases/155-96.html [https://perma.cc/V498-Z3T5]. The African Charter
established the Commission in Part II, Ch. I, Article 30, to “promote human and peoples’
rights and ensure their protection in Africa.”
32. Id.
33. Id. at paras. 2-6.
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Furthermore, the Nigerian Army had attacked, burned, and destroyed Ogoni
villages in response to building protests against the environmental destruction,
leaving thousands homeless.34
The Commission ruled that this constituted a violation of the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.35 Nigeria had an obligation to “take reasonable
and other measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote
conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable development and use of
natural resources.”36 Nigeria had not only failed to fulfill this obligation, but also
“exacerbate[d] the situation” by engaging in aggressive conduct.37 In reaching this
conclusion, the Commission assessed the Charter’s general requirements to
“respect,” “protect,” and “fulfill” the enumerated human rights, the specific
language of Article 24, and other international treaties and holdings from other
international tribunals to hold that Nigeria’s actions constituted a violation.38
As a starting point, the African Charter’s explicit enumerated right of people
to a “general satisfying environment” demonstrates that the global community is
moving toward incorporating environmental harms—insofar as they negatively
affect people—into international criminal law. This alone is instructive for the
ICC. This right had been criticized for being “vague and ambiguous,” lacking in
any definition of either “satisfying” or “environment.”39 However, the
Commission’s holding against Nigeria illuminated the scope of the right as a
“protection for human beings, the environment and the relationship shared between
them,” providing precedent for greater accountability for actions along the Niger
Delta.40 The Commission held that “participat[ing] directly in the contamination
of the environment through air, water and soil pollution . . . adversely affect[ing]

34. Id. at para. 7.
35. Specifically, Articles 2, 4, 14, 16, 18(1), 21 and 24—the rights to freedom from
discrimination, life, property, health, protection of family and vulnerable groups, free
disposal of wealth and resources, and a general satisfactory environment.
36. Id. at para. 52.
37. Id. at para. 54.
38. Id. at paras. 52 and 57, citing to Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which “requires governments to take necessary steps
for the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene”; the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, Velàsquez Rodrígeuz Case, Judgment of July 19, 1988,
Series C, No. 4, holding that “when a State allows private persons or groups to act freely
and with impunity to the detriment of the rights recognised, it would be in clear violation of
its obligations to protect the human rights of its citizens”; and the European Court of Human
Rights, X and Y v. Netherlands, 91 ECHR (1985) (Ser. A) at 32, requiring an “obligation on
authorities to take steps to make sure that the enjoyment of the rights is not interfered with
by any other private person.”
39. Morné Van Der Linde, Considering the interpretation and implementation of
article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in light of the SERAC
communication, 3 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL 167, (2001) available at
http://www.ahrlj.up.ac.za/van-der-linde-m-louw-l#_ftnref13 [https://perma.cc/U53N-8W
ZD].
40. Id.
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the health of the Ogoni people” alone could constitute a violation of human rights
is important—dispelling concerns that Article 24 rights could not be argued in
isolation, but rather required them to be attached to other violations of rights.41
Furthermore, the African Commission’s holding that Nigeria’s conduct facilitating
the destruction of Ogoni land amounted to “massively and systematically
violat[ing]” the rights of the Ogoni people42 is an example of actions that can
amount to the ICC’s threshold standards of “widespread” and “systematic”
intentional acts against a specific community. Finally, the Commission’s
willingness to draw on other international tribunals—both the Inter-American
Commission and the European Court—further cement an important precedent that
the ICC can look to other tribunals to seek analysis of particular situations.43
B.

The European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights demonstrates an evolution in statutory
interpretation of human rights that includes environmental considerations and
poses a comparative example with similar procedural thresholds of proof from
which the ICC can draw. Though the European Court lacks explicit protection for
or right to a healthy environment like the African Charter, the Court recognizes
that human rights and the environment are “mutually reinforcing,” and that the
environment “is protected by international law despite the absence of a general
framework convention.”44 The Court has adopted an “evolutive approach”
interpreting the Convention’s enumerated rights as a “living constitution” in light
of “social context and changes in society.”45 As such, the Court has held that
“adverse environmental factors” can violate certain human rights guaranteed by
the European Convention, such as the right to life, the right to a respect for private
and family life, the right to a fair trial and court access, the right to information,
the right to an effective remedy, and the right to a peaceful enjoyment of
possessions.46 It is important to note that the European Convention makes no
mention of environmental harm, nor was there a legal definition of “environment”
at the time it was created.47 However, the Court has evolved to not only consider
41. Id.
42. The Ogoni Case at para. 59.
43. There is precedence for international tribunals citing to other tribunals. For a
report of the European Court of Human Rights citing to the Inter-American Instruments of
Human Rights (both the Court and the Commission) 59 times, see European Court of Human
Rights, Research Report (2016), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_
inter_american_court_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW5W-EVEA].
44.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(2012), at 31 and 7, http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/ DH_DEV_Manual_Environment
_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/ M6DM-VB55].
45. Id. at 31.
46. Id. at 8, citing to Articles 2, 8, 6, 10, 13 of the European Convention, and Article
1 of Protocol 1 of the Social Charter, respectively.
47. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 44, at 15–16 (2012).
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environmental damage as a violation of rights enumerated in the Convention, but
also now lists the prevention of environmental harm as part of the interpretation of
State’s “positive obligations.”48 The Court has held that States have a “positive
obligation” to guarantee that the rights of the Convention are not violated through
“dangerous activities” utilizing the environment to negatively affect people, even
through actions performed by private parties.49
Similar to the Rome Statute’s requirements, the European Court considers
the “harmfulness of the dangerous activities and the foreseeability of the risks to
life,” along with whether “causal links exist[] between the activity and the negative
impact on the individual and whether the adverse effects have attained a certain
threshold of harm.”50 The Court determines whether the threshold has been met
by assessing “all the circumstances of the case” including the “intensity and
duration” of the harm, the physical and/or mental harm, and the “general
environmental context.”51 This echoes the ICC’s procedural steps to decide
whether sufficient evidence exists that the “gravity” of the crime warrants an
investigation. The ICC looks to both “qualitative and quantitate” factors, including
the number of victims, the extent of damage, the physical and/or psychological
harm that occurs, and the “geographical or temporal spread” of the acts.52 Finally,
the European Court requires a similar level of mens rea for conviction—that the
State has knowledge that harm will occur from their action (or inaction, as is the
case with the positive duty). However, “knowledge” may be proven in the
environmental harm context if the State “knew—or ought to have known—that
there was a real and immediate risk to the lives of the people living near” the
dangerous activity.53
C.

Inter-American Commission of Human Rights

The Inter-American Commission expanded protections beyond the
enumerated rights to provide indigenous peoples with the right to communal
property over their lands, territories, and natural resources, further demonstrating
the broadening of human rights in relation to the environment. Article XXIII of

48. Id. at 18.
49. Id.
50. Id. 18–20.
51. Id. at 20.
52. 2016 Policy Paper, supra note 1, paras. 37–38.
53. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 44, at 37 (citing to Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], paragraph 101, holding that “the Turkish
authorities at several levels knew or ought to have known that there was a real and immediate
risk to a number of persons living near the Ümraniye municipal rubbish tip. They
consequently had a positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to take such
preventive operational measures as were necessary and sufficient to protect those
individuals (see paragraphs 92-93 above), especially as they themselves had set up the site
and authorized its operation, which gave rise to the risk in question.”; available at
http://www.globalhealthrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ECtHR-2004-Oneryildizv-Turkey.pdf [https://perma.cc/SEH8-JMY9].
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the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and Article 21 of the
American Convention on Human Rights (the sources of law for the Commission)
enumerate the right to property, but like the European Convention, neither
instrument explicitly protects the environment.54 However, the Inter-American
Commission has broadened the scope of this right to give emphasis on protecting
the land rights of indigenous peoples. The Commission interprets human rights as
“evolving standards . . . in the light of developments in the field of international
human rights law . . . as evidenced by treaties, custom and other relevant sources
of international law.”55
As such, and in accordance with evolving standards of indigenous peoples’
rights, the Commission has held that the right to property holds particular
significance to indigenous groups “because [it] is a fundamental basis for the
development of indigenous communities’ culture, spiritual life, integrity and
economic survival.”56 The Commission has held that “territory” includes “the use
and enjoyment of its natural resources,” which is further defined broadly as “air,
land, water, natural gas, coal, oil, petroleum, minerals, wood, topsoil, fauna, flora,
forests and wildlife.”57 In addition to requiring states to uphold and protect the
rights established, the Commission requires that the state ensure the “actual
existence of an efficient guarantee of the free and full exercise of human rights,”
specifically “in relation to their territorial rights,” and requiring “concrete measures
to make the right effective.”58 This emphasis on the relationship between
indigenous groups and the land manifests such that “the recovery, recognition,
demarcation, and registration of the lands represents essential rights for cultural
survival and for maintaining the community’s integrity.”59 The Commission
recognizes that lack of access to the land can “produce conditions of extreme
poverty for the affected indigenous communities”: therefore, a State’s lack of

54. Am. Declaration of the Rts. and Duties of Man, Ninth Int’l Conf. of Am. Sts. art.
XXIII, 1948, “Every person has a right to own such private property as meets the essential
needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home”;
Am. Convention on Hum. Rts. art. XXI, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. B-32, “Right to Property. 1.
Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate
such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. 2. No one shall be deprived of his property
except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest,
and in the cases and according to the forms established by law. 3. Usury and any other form
of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law.”
55. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’
Rights Over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.56/09,
Dec. 30, 2009, Chapter II, para. 8.
56. Id. at para. 2.
57. Id. at paras. 2 and 41.
58. Id. at para. 44, citing to I/A Court H.R., Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous
Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 29th, 2006.
Series C No. 146, par. 167. I/A Court H.R., Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia.
Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, par. 142.
59. Id. at para. 56, citing to IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights
in Peru. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 59 rev., June 2, 2000, Chapter X, para. 16.
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action in protecting these rights “expose[s] indigenous and tribal peoples to
precarious or sub-human living conditions in the fields of access to food, water,
dignified housing, basic utilities and health[.]”60 This constitutes “subjecting them
to situations of extreme unprotectedness, which entail[s] violations of their
rights.”61
This “evolutionary interpretation of human rights” protections for specific
groups of peoples is a conglomeration of Commission-made interpretations of the
American Convention and the American Declaration’s right to property, and
demonstrates the use of a specific group’s context and history to rationalize
deviating from enumerated human rights definitions.62 Such an example aligns
with the ICC’s criteria for prioritization: accounting for specific pressing issues,
adapting to the most significant issues “of concern to the international community
as a whole,” while balancing the most efficient use of the ICC’s limited resources.63
Adopting the Inter-American Commission’s interpretation to focus on the impact
of crimes in which “environmental damage inflicted on the affected communities,”
the ICC can utilize their new Policy Paper’s shift to giving particular consideration
of crimes “committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the destruction of
the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal
dispossession of land.”64
The recent holdings of the three major international human rights tribunals
shed light on emerging norms in including environmental harm at least for their
anthropocentric consequences. The ICC can learn from the African Commission’s
recent interpretation of peoples’ right to a “general satisfactory environment”65 to
be violated by a state “participat[ing] directly in the contamination of the
environment through air, water and soil pollution” such that it “adversely affects
the health” of a particular group of people. The European Court and InterAmerican Commission, while lacking in a similarly enumerated environmental
right, have both demonstrated broad interpretations of existing human rights that

60. Id. at para 57, citing I/A Court H.R., Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous
Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 17, 2005. Series
C No. 125, par. 164; and IACHR, Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela. Doc.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 54, 30 December 2009, paras. 1076-1080.
61. Id.
62. Id. at para. 59, noting that “Consistent with its evolutionary interpretation of
human rights guarantees in Inter-American instruments, the IACHR has held that ‘Article
21 of the American Convention recognizes the right to property of members of indigenous
communities within the framework of communal property,’ and that the right to property
under Article XXIII of the American Declaration ‘must be interpreted and applied in the
context of indigenous communities with due consideration of principles relating to the
protection of traditional forms of ownership and cultural survival and rights to land,
territories and resources.’”
63. 2016 Policy Paper, supra note 1, at paras. 12, 35, and 49.
64. Id. at para. 41.
65. African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Par. I, ch. 1, Article 24 (Oct. 21,
1986) available at http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4K3P-NT5K].
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encompass environmental destruction as a violation of those rights. Further, the
European Court’s procedural considerations on the level of harm caused by the
dangerous activity, the foreseeability and knowledge of the perpetrator, and the
causal link between the act and the harm, mirror the ICC’s procedural threshold
requirements.66 Finally, the Inter-American Commission presents a novel
expansion of right to property protections that take into account previous historical
and societal context to better protect indigenous peoples’ land as a reflection of
their ancestral territory. Together, these progressions of human rights protections
support the ICC’s 2016 Policy Paper’s new focus shift, and present guideposts for
traversing new potential cases crimes against humanity as a vehicle to obtain
justice for environmental destruction.

Part III: Applying A New Standard for Environmental Crimes
This note has demonstrated that the Rome Statute creates the possibility to
prosecute environmental destruction as a means of extermination or forcible
deportation under crimes against humanity. Such an interpretation and focus aligns
with the movement of other international human rights tribunals. Using the
language of the Rome Statute and the lessons learned from the African
Commission, European Court, and Inter-American Commission, this final section
will examine how the ICC could prosecute individuals for crimes against humanity
for their actions in Myanmar and Cambodia.
A.

The “Extermination” of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar

As mentioned in Part I, individuals in the Myanmar government have
allegedly been specifically targeting an ethnic religious minority, using tactics such
as attacking and burning villages, homes, and farms; physically attacking, beating,
stabbing, and shooting the villagers; and forcing survivors to flee on foot to the
neighboring border of Bangladesh.67 Human rights advocates estimate that the
attacks have killed thousands of people, and have forced over four hundred
thousand Rohingya Muslims to flee for their lives to Bangladesh, creating a
“humanitarian crisis” as the country attempts to handle the influx of persecuted
refugees.68

66. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 44, at 18–20.
67. Testimony of Daniel P. Sullivan, Senior Advocate for Human Rights Refugees
International, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific:
“Burma’s Brutal Campaign Against the Rohingya” [hereinafter “Sullivan Testimony”]
(Sept. 27, 2017) at 1, available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20170927/10
6434/HHRG-115-FA05-Wstate-SullivanD-20170927.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5ZT-FX8B].
68. Id. at 4, see also Feliz Solomon, Myanmar’s Crisis, Bangladesh’s Burden:
Among the Rohingya Refugees Waiting for a Miracle, TIME (Nov. 23, 2017), http://time.
com/5031342/bangladesh-myanmar-rohingya-refugee-crisis/
[https://perma.cc/WGD2KK5N] (for more on the resulting harms from the forced transfer to Bangladesh, which is
beyond the “extermination” elements of this paper).
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As outlined in detail in Part I, for an act to constitute a crime against
humanity as an “extermination” under Article 7(1)(b), an individual must be found
to have (1) “killed one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of life
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population,” (2) the conduct
must have “constituted, or took place as part of, a mass killing of members of a
civilian population, (3) such conduct must be “part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against a civilian population,” and (4) the individual must have
“[known] that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”69 Human
rights advocates have alleged that Myanmar military leader Senior General Min
Aung Laing is “directly responsible for the crisis,” noting first-hand accounts
showing that the burning of villages and environmental destruction has been
perpetrated by Myanmar soldiers in Army uniform.70 If the prosecutors can
confirm the allegations against the military leader, the intentional burning of homes
and farmland leading to the deaths of at least one person satisfies the first
element.71 There is ample evidence of fires and destruction being purposefully
focused only on Rohingya villages, skipping over non-Rohingya villages.72 This,
coupled with the reports of internal domestic policies skewed to disfavor and
discriminate against the ethnic minority (restricting the “basic freedoms to marry,
have children, practice religion, work, or to move freely”) demonstrate a
particularly “widespread” and “systematic” targeting of this particular ethnic
minority, satisfying the second and third elements. Finally, while there is a solid
case for “knowing” that death will result from burning down a village, the ICC has
rules that “if a continuous and foreseeable result” of the harm “is that a people, a
culture or habitat will be destroyed,” the actions satisfy the “knowing” element for
extermination.73
B.

The “Deportation or Forcible Transfer” of Civilians in Cambodia

Land grabbing in Cambodia has been addressed by the international criminal
and environmental academic community previously, even in the context of the ICC

69. I.C.C., Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(b) “extermination” [hereinafter “Elements
of Crimes”] (2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD
7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/324C-KGXU].
70. Sullivan Testimony at 5.
71. The author recognizes that this is a significant “if,” but the purpose of this paper
is not quite to advocate the specific prosecution for either the Rohingya or Cambodian cases.
Rather, it is to demonstrate the avenues down which the ICC can tread to begin prosecuting
such cases—that it is capable and seemingly willing to do so.
72. Sullivan Testimony at 2, see also, Council on Foreign Rel., The Rohingya Crisis
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis [https://perma.cc/BU32C5ER].
73. Payal Patel, Expanding Past Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and War
Crimes: Can an ICC Policy Paper Expand the Court’s Mandate to Prosecuting
Environmental Crimes?, 14 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 175, 191 (2016).
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and the Rome Statute.74 Some policy experts even credit the 2015 Communication
to the ICC from international lawyer Richard Rogers from Global Diligence on
behalf of Cambodian victims as the tipping point, leading ICC Prosecutor Fatou
Bensouda to publish her 2016 Policy Paper.75 Regardless, over 2.6 million
hectares of land in Cambodia had reportedly been “grabbed,” taken from the
farmers who owned the land and leased to private companies as “Economic Land
Concessions.”76 That amounts to a staggering seventy-three percent of the nation’s
arable land.77 In his Comment to the ICC, Rogers alleges that the “Ruling Elite”—
a small number of senior members of the Cambodian ruling government, executive
officials in the State security forces, and government-connected business leaders—
have perpetrated human rights violations against Cambodian civilians through
forcible transfer, a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute.78 He alleges
that 770,000 people have been forcibly transferred away from their homes and
ancestral land under threat of “brutal violence, trumped-up criminal charges and
other forms of persecution,”79 with indigenous communities facing particular
hardship.80 To quell the uprising and societal unrest arising from forcible removals
from the land, “dissidents” have reportedly been “assassinated, murdered, beatenup, subjected to trumped-up charges and illegal detention, and persecuted due their
opposition to the Ruling Elite.”81
As outlined in greater detail in Part I, under Article 7(1)(d), “deportation or
forcible transfer of population” consists of five elements: (1) that the perpetrator

74. Id. at 193, see also Luigi Prosperi & Jacopo Terrosi, Embracing the ‘Human
Factor’, 15 J. INT’L CRIM JUSTICE 509 at n.10 (2017) for a longer list of secondary articles
regarding Cambodian “land concessions” and “land grabs,” and Human Rights Watch, Joint
Letter to UNHRC on Human Rights Situation in Cambodia (Aug. 20, 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/20/joint-letter-unhrc-human-rights-situation-cambodia
[https://perma.cc/7N2K-LK95].
75. Global Diligence, Land Grabbers May End Up In The Hague: Global Diligence
Welcomes The ICC Prosecutor’s New Case Selection Policy (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.
globaldiligence.com/2016/09/15/land-grabbers-may-end-up-in-the-hague-global-diligence
-welcomes-the-icc-prosecutors-new-case-selection-policy/ [https://perma.cc/8Q2 9-43FM].
See also, Global Diligence, Communication Under Article 15 of the Rome Statute of the
I.C.C., The Commission of Crimes Against Humanity in Cambodia (2014), https://
www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/executive_summary-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SPK-ML28].
76. Testimony of Richard Rogers, U. S. Cong., House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Property Rights and Development in Southeast Asia
(Aug. 21, 2015), at 3, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20150821/103858/HHRG114-FA05-Wstate-RogersR-20150821.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2TX-FETJ].
77. Id. at 4.
78. Global Diligence, The Commission of Crimes Against Humanity in Cambodia, at
para. 3 (2014).
79. Id. at 6–7.
80. Id. at 8, arguing that “Of the estimated 190,000 minorities, more than half may
have already been forcibly excluded from communal and ancestral land. Due to their
particular dependence on and cultural attachment to land, the land grabbing has devastated
their livelihood and threatened their ethnic identify.”
81. Id. at 10.
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deport[] or forcibly transfer[], without grounds permitted under international law,
one or more persons to another State or location, by expulsion or other coercive
acts,” (2) that those deported were “lawfully present” in the area, (3) that the
perpetrator knew that those deported were lawfully present, (4) the conduct was
committed as “part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population,” and (5) that the perpetrator “knew that the conduct was part of or
intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population.”82 In his Communication, Rogers lists a table with
72 events of forcible transfer affecting “thousands of Cambodians,” who were
legally present on land either owned by the families or else belonging to indigenous
groups as ancestral land, satisfying elements 1 and 2.83 That the attacks were
supported by members of the government and the forceful nature of the attacks (10
of the 72 evicted events were accompanied by the murder at least one person)
evidence the perpetrators’ knowledge of the legal status of the people from whom
they grabbed the land. The Communication points to the “massive number of
victims and the geographical reach” of the actions against civilian groups, coupled
with the “organized nature and reoccurring pattern of criminal conduct,” which
satisfies elements 4 and 5.84
For both the Rohingya crisis and the Cambodian land grab crisis, the actions
against the environment—whether in targeted burning and destruction of land as
an “extermination,” or the “deportation” of Cambodian citizens under threat of
force—were used in tandem with other extreme tactics to either target a specific
group or the general civilian population. On its face, these cases stand as possible
ICC investigations in light of the recent Policy Paper’s intended shift to prosecuting
crimes “committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the destruction of the
environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal
dispossession of land.”85
Additionally, the examples from the African
Commission, the European Court, and the Inter-American Commission strengthen
the argument for greater will from the international community to address these
issues within the human rights framework. Specifically, the ICC can draw upon
the African Commission’s willingness to draw on other international tribunals in
its analysis of the potential extermination and alleged forcible transfer;86 the
European Court’s similar mens rea requirements to allow “knowledge” proven for
either “extermination” or “deportation” as “knew—or ought to have known—that

82. Elements of Crimes, supra note 69, art. 7(1)(d) “Crime against humanity of
deportation or forcible transfer of population.”
83. Global Diligence, The Commission of Crimes Against Humanity in Cambodia, at
para. 19 (2014).
84. Id. at para. 21.
85. 2016 Policy Paper, supra note 1, at para. 41.
86. There is precedence for international tribunals citing to other tribunals. For a
report of the European Court of Human Rights citing to the Inter-American Instruments of
Human Rights see EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, RESEARCH REPORT (2016),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_inter_american_court_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ABY5-PT54].
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there was a real and immediate risk to the lives of the people living near” the
activities perpetrated;87 and finally, the Inter-American’s example of “evolving
standards . . . in the light of developments in the field of international human rights
law”88 to use the decades of Cambodian land grab suffering to rationalize deviating
from enumerated human rights definitions.89

Conclusion
The emerging trends in international jurisprudence and the growing amount
of scholarship regarding environmental harms is leading to a shift in the way that
the global community thinks about crime. The ICC Policy Paper presents an
opening for a substantive and tangible step in holding accountable actors who
utilize their power and disregard the environment at the expense of others. Though
the ICC’s traditional remit via the Rome Statute presents institutional hurdles
through high thresholds of voluntary actions and specific intent, there is space
within the definition of “crimes against humanity” to incorporate environmental
harm. This opening, combined with the global shift in attention to environmental
harm, will allow for the ICC to begin prosecuting individuals for their actions
against nature. Crimes against humanity as it was defined was meant to expand
and grow with the consciousness of the global community. Other international
tribunals have seized on this, adopting an evolving approach to interpreting human
rights violations in light of “social context and changes in society.”90 With the
2016 Policy Paper, a platform was created for elevating deliberate harm against the
environment to a violation of human rights.

87. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 44, at 37, citing to Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], para. 101.
88. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’
Rights Over Their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc.56/09,
Dec. 30, 2009, Chapter II, para. 8.
89. Id. at para. 59.
90. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 44, at 31.
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